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INTRODUCTION

On August 30, 1971, the California Supreme Court handed down a decision in Serrano v. Priest' which was heralded as a crucial breakthrough in
education reform. 2 Although commentators on education had for decades
deplored the gross fiscal disparities caused by school finance systems which
relied substantially on local district wealth, 3 little progress toward eliminating
such disparities had been achieved through legislative or administrative
channels. 4 However, with the California Supreme Court's adoption of the
principle of fiscal neutrality-"The quality of education may not be a function of
wealth other than the wealth of the state as a whole" 5-new hope was created among
7
school finance reformers. 6 After Serrano, school finance laws in Texas,
*Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law; B.A., Wesleyan University;
J.D., University of Michigan School of Law; Director, Education Law Center, Inc. For a lengthier
treatment of the issues dealt with in this article, see Tractenberg, Reforming School Finance Through
State Constitutions: Robinson v. Cahill Points the Way, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 365 (1974). The author
served as counsel to the Newark Chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People and the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, amid in the Robinson
v. Cahill litigation.
5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). The court found California's school
finance laws to be in violation of the fourteenth amendment of the U.S. Constitution because they
discriminated against plaintiffs--students in a district with low property values and their parents.
The court utilized a "strict scrutiny" test in determining that the equal protection clause had been
violated, rather than a "rational relationship" test, viewing the state's financing scheme as touching
upon a "fundamental interest"-education-and as creating a "suspect classification" by conditioning "full entitlement" to education on the "collective affluence" of a child's parents and
neighbors. Six of the seven justices concluded that the state had failed to meet its burden of establishing that the financing scheme was necessary to the attainment of any "compelling state
interest." See generally Developments in the Law--Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L REv. 1065 (1969).
2See, e.g., TIME, Sept. 13, 1971, at 47, where Serrano was called "[p]otentially ...the most
far-reaching court ruling on schooling since Brown v. Board of Education in 1954."
Serrano has been one of the most analyzed cases in recent years, For citations tormuch of this
literature, see Note, A StatisticalAnalysis of the School Finance Decisions: On Winning Battles and Losing
Wars, 81 YALE I.J. 1303 n.2 (1972). Serrano has also been the subject of several symposia. See, e.g.,
1972 U. ILL. L.F. 215; 2 YALE REv. L. & Soc. ACTION 108 (1971).
3See, e.g., J. CooNs, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION
chs. 1, 4 (1970); A. WISE, RICH SCHOOLS, POOR SCHOOLS (1968).
4The New Jersey experience has been relatively typical. Despite repeated efforts to increase
the level and equalizing effect of state aid, the state's contribution remains grossly deficient in
both respects. See Bole, A History of State School Support in New Jersey, in STATE AID TO SCHOOL DISTRICTS STUDY COMMISSION, A STATE SCHOOL SUPPORT PROGRAM FOR NEW JERSEY 16 (1968)

[hereinafter cited as BATEMAN REPORT, after the Commission's Chairman].
5
J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, supra note 3, at 2.
6 Despite considerable favorable comment, Serrano and its fiscal neutrality theory have also
generated a considerable amount of critical comment concerning the implications for educational
reform. See, e.g., Carrington, On EgalitarianOverzeal: A Polemic Against the Local School Property
Tax Cases, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 232; Goldstein, Interdistrict Inequalities in School Financing: A Critical
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Minnesota, 8 Kansas, 9 New Jersey,' 0 Arizona,"1 and Michigan' 2 were struck
down in rapid succession; 13 and challenges to similar laws were brought in
more than thirty other states. 14 Only courts in New York 5 and Indiana" sustained their respective school finance statutes.
Due to the conflict created by the post-Serrano decisions, most of which
were based upon the Federal Constitution, the United States Supreme Court
asserted itself as final arbiter in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez.'7 In a 5-4 decision, the Court rejected the Serrano rationale, declined to give education the status of a "fundamental right," and refused to
find a "suspect classification" because the school finance law relied on districts
with disparate tax capacity. It thus bound itself to apply the less stringent
rational basis test to the Texas statute. The Court concluded that the state's
system represented a rational accommodation of the interest in local fiscal
Analysis of Serrano v. Priest and Its Progeny, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 504 (1972); Kirp & Yudof, Serrano
in the PoliticalArena, 2 YALE REv. L. & Soc. ACTION 143 (1971); Moynihan, Solving the Equal Educational Opportunity Dilemma: Equal Dollars Is Not Equal Opportunity, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 259; Note,
A Statistical Analysis of the School FinanceDecisions: On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 YALE L.J.
1303 (1972). Advocates of fiscal neutrality, in turn, began to hit back, especially on the statistical
question of whether fiscal neutrality was likely to help or harm "poor" people. For a criticism
of the Yale Note, supra, see Grubb & Michelson, Public School Finance in a Post-Serrano World,
8 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. Rv. 550 (1973).
7 Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971),
rev'd, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
8 Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971).
9 Caldwell v. Kansas, Civil No. 50616 (Kan. Dist. Ct., Aug. 30, 1972).
10 Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972), modified and affd on other
grounds, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
11Hollins v. Shofstall, Civil No. C-253652 (Ariz. Super. Ct., June 1, 1972), rev'd, 110 Ariz.
88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973).
12 Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972), vacated, 390 Mich. 389, 212 N.W.2d
711 (1973)..
13 These decisions reflect a variety of combinations of state and federal claims and as a consequence vary in the extent to which they rely on the Serrano theory. Thus, the decision in Van
Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971), virtually tracked the Serrano opinion.
In Robinson, the trial judge found state and federal equal protection violations, as well as violations
of the state education and tax uniformity clauses. In Hollins v. Shofstall, Civil No. C-253652
(Ariz. Super. Ct., June 1, 1972), the court found discrimination against taxpayers in violation of
state and federal equal protection mandates, but emphasized that it was not constrained in its
finding of a state equal protection violation by federal equal protection precedents. By contrast,
Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 459 (1972), rested primarily on the interplay between
the state education and the state equal protection clauses. Also of interest was a Wyoming court's advisory opinion, Sweetwater County Planning Comm. v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971),juris.
relinquished, 493 P.2d 1050 (Wyo. 1972), which mingled the state tax uniformity clause and the
federal equal protection clause.
14 U.S.

OFFICE OF EDUCATION TASK FORCE ON SCHOOL FINANCE, ANALYSIS

OF INTRASTATE

SCHOOL FINANCE COURT CASES (1972). The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law has
served as a clearinghouse for information about school finance litigation, and has published
periodically a docket of pending cases in its Committee Report. The most recent was in Committee
Report No. 7 (Jan. 1972).
15
Spano v. Board of Educ. of Lakeland Cent. School Dist. #1, 68 Misc. 2d 804, 328 N.Y.S.2d
229 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
1
Jenson v. Board of Tax Comm'rs, 41 U.S.L.W. 2390 (Ind. Cir. Ct. Jan. 15, 1973). The court,
applying the rational basis test, held that plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of proving
that the statutory scheme was irrational. See also Parker v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068, 1077,
1080-81 (D. Md. 1972), where the court, in denying a motion to dismiss, held that the rational or
reasonable basis test, rather than the strict scrutiny test, would be applied after trial of the issue.
17411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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and administrative control of schools and the desire to provide a basic education
for each child.'
Although Rodriguez seemed to eliminate one avenue for school finance
reform,"9 less than two weeks later a second was suggested by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Robinson v. Cahill.20 The court unanimously affirmed a
trial court invalidation of the state's school finance statute. Unlike the trial
court, however, the supreme court found the case to be inappropriate for
decision on federal or state equal protection grounds. Instead, it affirmed
solely on the basis of the "thorough and efficient" education clause of the New
Jersey constitution. 2 ' The primary purpose of this article is to give detailed
consideration to Robinson, its genesis, its legal theories, its constitutional
guidelines, and its implications for New Jersey and possibly for other states.
I
SETTING THE STAGE

The complaint in Robinson v. Cahill was filed in the Superior Court of New
Jersey on behalf of students, parents, taxpayers, public officials, and public
bodies. It urged in thirteen counts the unconstitutionality of the state's system
22
of financing public education.

The legal theory advanced by plaintiffs was that the equal protection clauses
of the United States and New Jersey Constitutions prohibited the state "from
18 For an analysis of Rodriguez, see Tractenberg, Reforming School Finance Through State Constitutions: Robinson v. Cahill Points the Way, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 365, 373-81 (1974).
'" There may still be a basis for resort to the federal courts in the following instances: (1) where
a high correlation between district and personal poverty may permit plaintiffs to argue that they
are functionally or absolutely indigent; (2) where evidence can be marshalled to demonstrate that
present inequities result from a history of deliberate economic segregation or other purposeful
discrimination; (3) where it can be shown that children in some districts are being denied an
"opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the
rights of speech
and of full participation in the political process." 411 U.S. at 37. For a discussion of the types of
cases which might fit within these categories, see Tractenberg, supra note 18, at 382-84. Another
conceivable basis for federal court intervention is found in the revitalization of a "sliding scale"
test under the equal protection clause. Id. at 379 n.75. See also Gunther, Foreword:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972).
20 62 NJ. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
22
22

N.J.

CONST.

art. VIII, § 4,

1.

At the time the original complaint was filed, the New Jersey financing statute, N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 18A:58-1 et seq. (Supp. 1973), provided for a traditional "minimum foundation" plan
under which the state guaranteed each district that if it raised its local "fair share" of tax dollars,
the state would provide the difference between that amount and the minimum foundation level.
In New Jersey, that level was $400, although the statewide average expenditure per pupil in 19691970 was $800.56. See 19 N.J. COMM'R OF EDUC. ANN. REP., FINANCIAL STATISTICS OF SCHOOL
DISTRICTS ix (1969-70). Many other states still have minimum foundation plans, with a wide range
of foundation levels. A new financing statute amended the New Jersey plan, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 18A:58-1 et seq. (Supp. 1973), by converting the minimum foundation program to an "incentive
equalization" program, effective July 1, 1971. Law of Oct. 26, 1970, ch. 234, [1970] N.J. Acts
832 [hereinafter cited as the Bateman Act]. The major differences were: (1) the classification
of school districts under the Bateman Act into different aid level categories in order to create
incentives for districts to improve the quality and scope of educational programs; (2) the introduction of the "weighted pupil" concept to reflect grade level and economic status in the state aid
program; and (3) the elimination of a fixed dollar ceiling on state equalization aid. The complaint
was amended to reflect the modifications in New Jersey's statutory plan effected by the Bateman
Act.
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discriminating in favor of children attending public schools in wealthy school
districts by distributing the State's educational resources in proportion to the
wealth of the respective school districts." 23 The theory--"fiscal neutrality"--and
the language of the complaint were strongly reminiscent of Serrano v. Priest.
The second count of the original Robinson complaint, however, advanced a
different argument-that the New Jersey constitution's "thorough and efficient" education clause required the state to afford each child "at least such
instruction as is necessary to fit it for the ordinary duties of citizenship" and
"to provide the minimum education to all children.., so that they may be
able to read, write and function in a political environment." 24 Plaintiffs alleged that the state had failed to do so and, thereby, had violated the education
clause of the state constitution and the equal protection clause of the United
States Constitution.
The relief plaintiffs sought under this count, however, was contained in
the same equal protection prayer appearing in nine other counts of the complaint. By focusing on equal protection arguments, the Robinson complaint
was in the prevailing mode. Yet it was a mode which had shown no probability
26
25
of success prior to that time. Even the Serrano case was then faring poorly.
It is, therefore, surprising that Robinson was filed at all.
But Robinson, in its inception, was a political as well as a legal statement.
It was a reaction to egregious disparities among school districts in available
fiscal resources per pupil, physical plants, and pupil achievement levels. Perhaps even more important, given the plaintiffs' original legal theories, it was
a reaction to disparities among taxpayers.
The New Jersey situation was, and still is, far worse than that in most states in
terms of state contributions to public education. Nationally, states have been
contributing about forty per cent to the total cost of operating the public
schools, the federal government approximately seven per cent, and the localities the balance, about fifty-three per cent. 27 In New Jersey, however, the state
share averaged only about twenty-eight per cent, and the federal share only
28
about five per cent. Thus, the local share has been about sixty-seven per cent.
Such heavy reliance on municipal and school district tax capacity has served
to magnify New Jersey's interdistrict disparities, which are among the largest
in the country. 29 Moreover, New Jersey's poorer districts invariably labor under
23 Complaint at First Count, 15, at 9.
3 & 5, at 18.
24 Complaint at Second Count,
2' United States Supreme Court affirmance of Burruss v. Wilkerson, 3 10 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va.
1969), affd mem., 397 U.S. 44 (1970), took place on February 24, 1970, just eleven days after the
Robinson complaint was originally filed.
26 The Superior Court of Los Angeles County upheld defendants' demurrer in an unreported
decision, and the court of appeals affirmed that decision on September 1, 1970. Serrano v. Priest,
App. 3d 1110, 89 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1970).
10 Cal.
27
See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, DIGEST OF EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS

COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, LOCAL SCHOOL EXPENDITURES: 1970 PROJECTIONS 63 (1970).
28 Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. at 231, 287 A.2d at 191.
29 The equalized valuation of taxable property per pupil in New Jersey in 1971 ranged from
$3,787 (Winfield Township) to $919,317 (Rockleigh). (The highest per pupil property values
actually were in Teterboro-$62,598,621-but the total enrollment was one student.) 20 N.J.
COMM'R OF EDUC. ANN. REP., FINANCIAL STATISTICS OF SCHOOL DIsTIuCrs 576 (1971-72). The
state average was $41,529. Id. at ix. Some 126 districts, containing 188,887 pupils, had equalized
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greater educational problems than other districts. In New Jersey, unlike many
other states, urban districts are among the poorer districts. 30 Meager local
fiscal resources, high municipal overburden (noneducational public service
expenditures) in the case of cities, 31 and generally high education-cost popula32
tions, have combined in many districts to cause decrepit school physical plants
and insufficient funds for current operations.3 3 This is so despite far greater
tax effort in most "poor" districts than in the "wealthy" or even "average"
districts.
Accompanying these fiscal disparities in resources, expenditures, and tax
burdens have been disparities in student performance. Until the 1972-1973
school year, New Jersey had no statewide educational testing program,
making precise interdistrict comparisons difficult. However, a leading New
Jersey educator has testified that about twenty per cent of New Jersey's
school districts are furnishing "inadequate education." 34 There is substantial
evidence that the urban and poor districts are prominent among those performing at low levels.33 The existence of a strong positive correlation bevaluations per pupil of more than $60,000; .and 149 districts, containing 459,835 pupils, had
equalized valuations per pupil of less than $30,000. Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. at 242,
287 A.2d at 197.
30 The following table, drawn from Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. at 282-85, 287 A.2d
at 218-21, compares the averages of the so-called "Big Six" school districts with the state averages
for equalized valuations per pupil, expenditures per pupil, school tax rate, and total tax rate.

STATE AVERAGE

Camden
Newark
Jersey City
Trenton
Paterson
Elizabeth

Equalized
valuation per
pupil, 1971

Current expenditures per pupil
1971-72

Equalized
scRool tax
rate, 1971

Equalized
total tax
rate, 1971

$41,026

$1,009.62

$2.12

$3.66

2.57
3.69
2.82
2.80
2.57
1.88

5.76
6.39
6.40
6.65
5.23
3.81

19,187
19,815
26,786
20,724
23,232
43,920

843.00
1,121.00
897.00
1,013.00
857.00
1,038.00

The current expenditure figures for Newark and Trenton, which slightly exceed the state average,
are explained by the relatively large amounts of federal aid received by those districts, by the special
state categorical aid received because of a high proportion of handicapped children, and, especially in Newark, by the school tax rate which is approximately 75 per cent higher than the state
average.
31See, e.g., J. BERKE & M. KIRST, FEDERAL AID TO EDUCATION: WHO BENEFITS? WHO
GOVERNS? 8-20 (1972); URBAN EDUCATION TASK FORCE REPORT ch. 2 (1970). For an intensive
study of urban cost factors in selected states, see B. LEVIN, T. MULLER & C. SANDOVAL, THE HIGH
COST OF EDUCATION IN CITIES (1973).
32See, e.g., N.J. URBAN SCHOOLS DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, THE STATUS OF EQUAL EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY IN NEW JERSEY'S MODEL CITIES 112-29 (1968) [hereinafter cited as N.J. MODEL
CITIES REPORT]. See also GOvERNoR's SELECT COMMISSION ON DISORDER, REPORT FOR ACTION

75 (1968), which reported that Newark's immediate school building needs would require a

capital outlay of more than $250,000,000. Another study at about the same time estimated the
cost at $314,422,000. N.J. MODEL CITIES REPORT 116.
33 At least three of New Jersey's six largest city school districts (i.e., Elizabeth, Jersey City,

and Newark) have threatened to dose their schools early in recent years because of an alleged lack
of operating funds. In fact, the Robinson complaint was filed at about the time the Jersey City
school
3 4 district, one of the plaintiffs, was threatening to close its schools.
See Robinson v. Cahill, 118 NJ. Super. at 247, 287 A.2d at 199.
35See, e.g., N.J. MODEL CITIES REPORT 53-56; NEWARK BOARD OF EDUCATION, REPORT OF
CITY-WIDE TESTING PROGRAM OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS (1972).
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tween expenditures and student performance, however, is an issue about which
36
social scientists, educators, and lawyers still disagree strongly.
The filing of the Robinson complaint must be viewed against this backdrop:
a history of manifestly inadequate state efforts to ensure that public education
was funded equally and at sufficient levels; the imminent enactment of a
widely heralded new school finance statute; and the unwillingness of federal
and state courts to overturn other state funding statutes even in light of conceded disparities and inequalities. It is not surprising, therefore, that Robinson
remained largely inactive for more than a year after its filing. However, after
the California Supreme Court rendered its decision in Serrano,37 the Robinson
plaintiffs began to press their case, moving for summary judgment on the
strength of Serrano.
The Robinson litigation shortly thereafter entered another stage when a
massive amici curiae brief was submitted on behalf of the Education Committee
of the Newark Chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People and the American Civil Liberties Union
of New Jersey. The
38
bulk of the brief focused on the state education clause.
The brief argued that the clause imposed on the state the obligation to
ensure that a "thorough and efficient" education be provided to all children
throughout the state, contending that this meant "as complete an education
as possible"--that is one which would produce an educated citizenry. Adequate
funding was viewed as essential to such an education. It was argued that the
New Jersey school finance statutes, however, had failed to guarantee all districts an adequate level of funding. This argument accurately reflected amici's
concern that plaintiffs, predominantly taxpayers, municipal officials, and
municipalities, might not regard education of children as their primary interest.
II
THE

NEW JERSEY

COURTS APPROACH THE

ISSUE

The New Jersey courts were confronted with these differing arguments
for invalidating the state's school finance laws. The defendants sought to combat the attack mounted by plaintiffs and amici by presenting testimony to the
effect that the New Jersey statutes represented "a fair, uniform, reasonable,
proper and constitutional exercise of legislative authority"; that any fiscal

" The enactment of the Bateman Act in 1970, and the report which led to it, seemed premised
on such a correlation. The Act, which became effective about a year and a half after the original
Robinson complaint was filed, represented an effort to bring New Jersey up to the national average
for state contributions to public education. See BATEMAN REPORT, supra note 4, at vii. It was the

latest in a series of New Jersey school financing statutes which appeared promising but which never
succeeded in maintaining a substantial level of state funding or in meaningfully equalizing
interdistrict fiscal disparities. Id. at 11-21.
37 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), rev'g 10 Cal. App. 2d 1110, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 345 (1970).
38 A major reason for this focus was concern about the limitations inherent in the fiscal neu-

trality approach to school finance reform. That theory simply asserts that the state may not use
the wealth of individual districts in developing a school finance scheme. Thus it assures neither
minimum levels of educational funding nor funding commensurate with educational needs.
An education clause with a quality standard, such as New Jersey's "thorough and efficient,"
arguably can provide the legal basis for more than simple "fiscal neutrality."
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or other disparities among districts were "innocuous in origin and ... judicially
irremediable by-products of a legitimate effort to provide a thorough and
efficient system of free public schools"; that differences in the quality of
education provided by districts resulted from "a host of factors, both tangible
and intangible"; and that, to the extent that more funds were desirable for
urban school districts, the legislative and executive branches were already
attempting to deal with the matter. 39
At the time that the Robinson case was before the trial court, an ever increasing number of courts, federal and state, had accepted the Serrano theory. 40
It was, therefore, not surprising that the trial court held the New Jersey
statutes unconstitutional principally under federal and state equal protection
clauses.
The court found evidence of substantial fiscal disparities among New
Jersey's approximately 600 school districts, of a direct relationship between
property values and expenditures per pupil, and of an inverse relationship between expenditures and local tax rates. 41 On the basis of this evidence, the court
concluded that differential resources and spending adversely affected the quality of education provided by poor districts. 42 Next, the court proceeded to examine the Bateman Act, 43 ruling that, despite its avowed purpose of increasing state
aid to certain deprived districts and of reducing disparities caused by district
property wealth variations, the Act had failed to equalize such interdistrict disparities to a significant degree. 44 The court held that the failure
of the Bateman Act to redress these disparities violated the federal and state
equal protection rights of taxpayers and students of poor districts; 4 and that,
at its then low level of funding, the Act was also not ensuring all students of
39 Rider to Pretrial Mem., 4 (filed May 11, 1973), App. of Defendants-Appellants at 39.
40 On December 23, 1971, a three-judge federal district court found for the plaintiff in Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971); and on
January 16, 1972, an Arizona superior court denied defendants' motion to dismiss in Hollins v.
Shofstall, Civil No. C-253652 (Ariz. Super. Ct., June 1, 1972).
41 See Appendix A to the trial court's original opinion, 118 N.J. Super. at 282-85, 287 A.2d
at 218-21, for the highest, lowest, and a representative sample of intermediate wealth and expenditure school districts in each of New Jersey's twenty-one counties. See also Figure 1, id. at 239,
287 A.2d at 195, for a graphic demonstration of the relationships between valuations and expenditures, and between expenditures and school taxes, for one relatively wealthy and one
relatively poor district in each of eight counties.
42 The trial court recognized that there were reasons for expenditure disparities which bore
no connection to educational quality, such as area cost-of-living differentials and varying proportions of children with special educational needs. It also noted the "qualified doubts about the
dollar-input-output relation." Id. at 253, 287 A.2d at 203. Nevertheless, thc court concluded
that the weight of evidence before it showed a "correlation between educational expenditures
and pupil achievement over and above the influence of family and other environmental factors."
Id. at 254, 287 A.2d at 203. Consequently, "a large number of New Jersey children [in poor districts were] not getting an adequate education." Id. at 257, 287 A.2d at 205.
"3 See note 22 supra.
44 The court gave four reasons for this conclusion: (1) equalization occurred only up to the
level of the statutorily guaranteed equalized valuations (an amount substantially below the state's
average equalized valuation), 118 N.J. Super. at 244, 287 A.2d at 198; (2) no "pre-funding"
was provided to facilitate the movement of poor districts upward through the Bateman Act's
categories to "comprehensive" district status, which would have provided higher levels of state aid,
id. at 265, 287 A.2d at 209; (3) the substantial minimum support and save-harmless aid provisions
were inconsistent with equalization, id. at 272-73, 287 A.2d at 212-13; (4) no provision was made
in the statute for municipal overburden, id. at 273, 287 A.2d at 213.
4' The court's approach was vintage Serrano, up to a point, with findings that education was
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the "thorough and efficient system of free public schools" guaranteed them
by the state constitution. 46 For these reasons, the court established two broad
remedial goals: (1) to raise education "to a 'thorough' level in all districts where
deficiencies exist,"47 and (2) to equalize "the tax burden in support of these
purposes." 48 To reach these goals it required the state to "finance a 'thorough
and efficient' system of education out of state revenues
raised by levies im49
class."
same
the
of
taxpayers
on
uniformly
posed
Despite these conclusions, the court recognized that the legislature would
require time to restructure the school finance statutes. Therefore, continued
operation of the school system under the pertinent state statutes was permitted
"unless and until specific operations under them are enjoined by the court." 50
The first such injunction could occur on January 1, 1973, if the legislature had
not enacted a "non-discriminatory system of taxation" 51 by that date; in that
event, the opinion and judgment provided for enjoining the distribution of
state funds to any school district as minimum aid or save-harmless payments.
Instead, those state funds would be used to increase the guaranteed valuations
and, thereby, to enhance the equalizing effect of the Bateman Act. Aside from
this possibility, the trial court indicated its intention not to enjoin operations
prior to January 1, 1974. But at that tine the court might enjoin any school
system funding operations if it deemed such action necessary. However, the
considerable pressure exerted on the legislature to act by January 1, 1973 was
removed when the state sought and gained a stay
of the trial court's judgment
"until further Order of the [Supreme] Court. '52
a "fundamental interest," that district wealth was a "suspect classification," and that there was
no "compelling state interest" to justify the financing system. Id. at 275-76, 287 A.2d at 214.
Indeed, the court expressed doubt about whether the finance system could even meet the less
stringent "rational basis" test. Id. at 276, 287 A.2d at 214. Concerned about justiciable standards
in the school finance area and, implcidty at least, about distinguishing education from other important municipal services, however, the court limited its equal protection holding to the raising
and expenditure of the funds necessary for the constitutionally mandated "thorough" education.
See id. at 277, 287 A.2d at 215. The court refused to decide whether, if sufficient funds were
provided to all districts for such an education,. additional locally-raised funds might be permitted. Id. at 278 n.21, 287 A.2d at 216 n.21. Permitting such unlimited local "leeway" or "topping
off" would almost inevitably defeat effective equalization of tax burden and educational expenditures.
46According to the trial court, the guaranteed "thorough" education was one marked by
"completeness and attention to detail. It means more than simply adequate or minimal." Id. at
268, 287 A.2d at 211. This level of education was not being provided to all students in New Jersey
by partial funding of the Bateman Act, id. at 269, 287 A.2d at 211, but probably would be with a
"fully funded" Act. Moreover, the constitutional mandate was not intended either to require
the state to fund education completely out of its general revenue, id. at 267, 287 A.2d at 210, or
to preclude local districts from raising amounts in addition to the state share and thereby augmenting the constitutionally mandated level of education. Thus, under the state education clause,
the court struck down only the minimum support and save-harmless aid provisions of the Bateman
Act, since it could find "no legitimate legislative purpose ih giving rich districts 'state aid"' when
other
4 7 districts were underfinanced. Id. at 270, 287 A.2d at 211.
d. at 281, 287 A.2d at 217.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 280, 287 A.2d at 217. The court found that the goal of a "thorough and efficient"
education had already been sufficiently defined and that the State Board and State Commissioner
of Education had ample statutory authority to enforce this mandate.
50 Id.
51
Id.
52On September 11, 1972, the supreme court filed its order granting the motion for stay,
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III
THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT DECISION

Despite the trend set by Serrano and its progeny, at oral argument be-

fore the New Jersey Supreme Court on January 9, 1973, Chief Justice Joseph
Weintraub and other members of the court expressed misgivings about the
implications of utilizing equal protection principles in the school finance area,
a concern which was ultimately reflected in the court's decision. Two weeks
after the United States Supreme Court decided Rodriguez, the New Jersey
Supreme Court released the Robinson opinion. The timing and form of the
opinion suggested that the New Jersey court was well aware of the psychological,
as well as doctrinal, impact of its opinion on the movement to reform school
finance laws through litigation.
Chief Justice Weintraub, writing for a unanimous court, paid little attention
to the factual matters which had dominated the trial court's opinion. He accepted "the trial court's findings of fact with respect to the existing disparities
in expenditures per pupil"53 based upon the district of residence; 54 found
it clear "that State aid [did] not operate substantially to equalize the sums
available per pupil";5 5 and stated, in conclusory terms and without citation,
that although equality of dollar input would not assure equality of educational
results because of "individual and group disadvantages" and "local conditions,"
"the quality of educational opportunity does depend in substantial measure
upon the number of dollars invested." 56
Having generally accepted the trial court's factual findings, the supreme
court also accepted its determination of unconstitutionality, though on different
theoretical bases. The trial court had treated the federal and state equal protection provisions as equally invalidating the Bateman Act because of its reliance on disparate local school district wealth. The supreme court perceived
significant distinctions concerning the reach of the respective clauses in this
area. Under neither provision, however, was it prepared to strike down the
statute, reversing the trial court's holding of unconstitutionality under the
57
federal equal protection clause on the basis of Rodriguez.
and denying plaintiffs' application for oral argument of the motion and plaintiffs' motion to advance
the appeal on the calendar.
53
54 62 N.J. at 481, 303 A.2d at 277.
Id., 303 A.2d at 276-77.
55
Id., 303 A.2d at 277.
"Id. The court largely ignored the disarray among social scientists and courts on this "costquality" issue. Compare J. COLEMAN, EQUA11TY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966), with J.
GUTHRIE, G. KLEINDORFER, H.

LEVIN, & R. STOUT, SCHOOLS AND INEQUAITY (1971). See also

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 42-43; ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (F. Mosteller & D.

Moynihan eds. 1972); Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 TEXAS L. REV.
411, 422-34 (1973).

By focusing on educational opportunity, rather than educational results,

the court may have sought to avoid a head-on meeting with the difficult social science problems
of relating input to output. This assumes, however, that the court did not consider educational
opportunity an output standard. For discussion of this point, see text accompanying notes
86-95 infra. Or the court may have satisfied itself by the simple fact that the legislature had acted
on the premise that educational expenditures were linked to quality when it provided state equalizing
aid to poor districts.
57
The court found that there was no reason to "believe the [United States Supreme Court]
majority would [have found] a federal constitutional flaw in the case before us." 62 NJ. at 489.
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Although Rodriguez arguably left the court with little maneuvering room
in its interpretation of the Federal Constitution, the state constitution's equal
protection clause 58 was another matter. The court has refused to treat that
clause as coextensive with the federal clause,59 or as requiring the same judicial approach. 60 Moreover, concern with the requirements of federalism, which
limits federal courts in their application of the Federal Constitution to state
actions, was absent; the state constitution, therefore, could have been construed to establish more demanding requirements. 6 1 Despite these factors,
the court chose not to decide Robinson on the basis of the state equal protection
2

clause.

6

The trial court had used the tax uniformity provision of the New Jersey
constitution 63 to buttress its conclusion that "the 'equality' provisions of the
State and Federal Constitutions preclude[d] taxing the same class of property
at different rates. ' 64 But nowhere did it state explicitly that the clause, by
itself, would have invalidated the Bateman Act. The supreme court rejected
any such implication. Although the tax uniformity clause was added to the
constitution in 1875, the same year as the education clause, the court found that
it "was not addressed to the subject of public education. '65 Moreover, it "was
not intended to say that a State function may not be delegated to local
government to be met by local taxation.1 66 The tax clause did require that
"if the State decides to handle a service at State level and to do so on the
basis of a property tax, it must tax all taxable property in the State rather than
303 A.2d at 281. The court's conclusion about the extension of Rodriguez was probably correct.
However, the court implied that it would have reached the same result under the Federal Constitution even before the Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez. Id. at 486, 303 A.2d at 279.
58 N.J. CONST. art I, 1. Although this provision does not refer to "equal protection of the laws,"
it has been construed to include the functional equivalent of such a clause. See, e.g., Bailey v.
Engelman, 56 N.J. 54, 55, 264 A.2d 442 (1970).
9 62 N.J. at 490-92, 303 A.2d at 282. Many state judiciaries have treated federal
court construction of the U.S. Constitution as dispositive of the meaning of their state constitutional counterparts. However, some state judiciaries, notably those of New Jersey and California, have sought to retain their independence. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Township of Morris
School Dist., 58 N.J. 483, 279 A.2d 619 (1971), where the New Jersey Supreme Court found that
the Commissioner of Education had implied power to regionalize school districts to achieve
racial balance; Booker v. Board of Educ., 45 N.J. 161, 212 A.2d 1 (1965), where the court held
that the state equal protection clause affirmatively required racial balance among public school
pupils.
60 62 N.J. at 491-92, 303 A.2d at 282.
61Id. at 490, 303 A.2d at 282.
62
Id. at 492, 500-01, 303 A.2d at 283, 287. The court was able more easily to avoid deciding
the impact of the state equal protection clause on the Bateman Act because of its conclusions
regarding the education clause. See text accompanying notes 68-71 infra. However, its refusal
to apply the former clause was tantamount to a negative determination on the issues of (1) equalization of taxpayer burdens, and (2) equalization of educational expenditures above the level for
a "thorough and efficient" education. The court hesitated to decide Robinson on the basis of the
state equal protection clause, largely because of the rigidity it perceived in an equal protection
solution to school finance inequities and the difficulty of separating education from other
"essential" governmental services. 62 N.J. at 492-501, 303 A.2d at 283-87. For a detailed
discussion of the court's approach to the state equal protection clause and the implications for
future finance reform litigation, see Tractenberg, supra note 18, at 403-14.
63 N.J. CONsT. art VIII, § 1, 1(a).
64118 N.J. Super. at 277, 287 A.2d at 215.
65 62 N.J. at 502, 303 A.2d at 288.
66

Id.
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only property in a part of the State. ' 67 Thus, the supreme court rejected arguments under the explicit "equality" provisions of the state constitution-the
equal protection and tax uniformity clauses-that education had to be funded
either by a state tax or by a tax which was administered locally but which fell
equally on taxpayers throughout the state.
The court's final inquiry was whether the 1875 education amendments 8
restricted legislative discretion to charge local governments with responsibility
for funding public school systems. The court reached an equivocal conclusion
on this question. On the one hand, it found no outright prohibition against
such assignment of responsibility; on the other, it struck down the Bateman
Act as incompatible with the state constitution's thorough and efficient system
of free public schools mandate, and expressed doubt about whether continued
reliance upon local taxation would enable the state to meet that mandate.
Ironically, having refused to find any "equality" requirement concerning
taxpayers or students in the express equality provisions of the state or Federal
Constitutions, the court construed the education clause as embodying such
a requirement as to students. The court concluded that the education clause
required the state to provide all its children with an equal opportunity to attain a thorough and efficient education. The Bateman Act, not being visibly
designed for the discharge of that mandate, was held unconstitutional.
The court's approach had been to seek answers to questions on four levels:
(1) what was meant by a "thorough and efficient" educational system, who was
obligated to provide such a system, who was entitled to benefit from it, how
could one measure whether it was being provided, and what responses had to
be made if it was not being provided; (2) what was an "equal educational opportunity" to obtain such an education and how did it relate to the "thorough
and efficient" education mandate; (3) where did school financing become involved in this problem; and (4) had the Bateman Act met the constitutional
requirements?
The 1875 constitutional amendment which added the education clause
was clearly intended to make education free to all, and to impose ultimate responsibility upon the state. According to the court, "[t]he obligation being the
State's to maintain and support a thorough and efficient system of free public schools, the State must meet that obligation itself or if it chooses to enlist
local government it must do so in terms which will fulfill that obligation." 69
The court expanded upon the state's responsibility under this clause later
67

d. at 502-03, 303 A.2d at 288.

In addition to the "thorough and efficient" clause, N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, 1, the court
treated as an education amendment the provision prohibiting "private, local or special laws"
in "enumerated cases," which included "[p]roviding for the management and control of free
public schools." Id. art. IV, § 7, 9. The court never addressed itself, however, to the separate
impact of the latter provision, as had several early education cases in New Jersey. See, e.g., Riccio
v. Hoboken, 69 N.J.L. 649, 661, 55 A. 1109, 1113 (Ct. Err. & App. 1903); Landis v. Ashworth,
57 N.J. 509, 31 A. 1017 (1895). In these cases the courts had recognized that a school law could
be unconstitutional as special or local legislation if districts with different characteristics were
grouped in the same class and were treated in the same way, or if the effect of the law were special
or local. There are several arguments for the invalidity of the Bateman Act along these lines.
See Tractenberg, supra note 18, at 415 n.253.
69 62 N.J. at 509, 303 A.2d at 292.
68
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in its opinion. The state was required to "define in some discernible way the
educational obligation,"70 and, if it chose to act through local government,
it would have to compel school districts to meet the constitutional command.
Moreover, the state would have to compensate for local failures. 7 ' Quite properly, the court left to the state's education authorities, or to the legislature,
the task of giving detailed content to the words "thorough and efficient."
It did, however, provide some significant guidelines.
First, it suggested that the meaning was a relative one, changing with the
needs of the times. As an example, the court contrasted the 1970's with the
1890's, when only elementary school education was provided, and stated that
"[tioday, a system of public education which 7did
not offer high school educa2
tion would hardly be thorough and efficient."
Second, the court suggested that the standard should be calibrated against
the demands of the post-schooling world. "The Constitution's guarantee,"
said the court, "must be understood to embrace that educational opportunity
which is needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child for his role as
73
a citizen and as a competitor in the labor market.
Third, the court implied that "thorough and efficient" education might not
be the best possible education, quoting Landis v. AshworthU4 with approval.
Nor can I think that the constitution requires the legislature to provide the
same means of instruction for every child in the state. A scheme to accomplish
that result would compel either the abandonment of all public schools designed
for the higher education of youth [high schools] or the establishment of such
schools in every section of the state.... Neither of these consequences was
contemplated by the amendment of 1875. Its purpose was to impose on the
legislature a duty of providing for a thorough and efficient system of free schools,
capable of affording to every child such instruction as is necessary to fit it for
the ordinary duties of citizenship; and such provision our school laws would
make, if properly executed, with the view of securing the common rights of
all before tendering peculiar advantages to any. But, beyond this constitutional
obligation, there still exists the power of the legislature to provide, either
directly or indirectly, in its discretion, for the further instruction of youth in
such branches of learning as, though not essential, are yet conducive to the public
service. On this power, I think, rest the laws75under which special opportunities
for education at public expense are enjoyed.
The Landis approach suggests that "thorough and efficient" education is the equivalent of basic or adequate education. The court in
70 1d. at 519, 303 A.2d at 297.
71
Id.At points, the court addressed itself explicitly to local district responsibility for raising
funds. As delegees of broad operating responsibility for the public schools, however, local districts
could be held equally accountable for the discharge of other duties related to providing education.
The court recognized this potential:
A system of instruction in any district of the State which is not thorough and efficient
falls short of the constitutional command. Whatever the reasonfor the violation, the obligation
is the State's to rectify it. If local government fails, the State government must compel
it to act, and if the local government cannot carry the burden, the State must itself meet
its continuing obligation.
Id. at
72 513, 303 A.2d at 293 (emphasis added).
1d. at 515, 303 A.2d at 295.
73 Id.

-457 N.J.L. 509, 31 A. 1017 (1895).

75Id. at 512, 31 A. at 1018, quoted in 62 N.J. at 514-15, 303 A.2d at 294-95.

.324

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

that case used words such as "ordinary," "common," and "essential" to characterize the state's obligation under the education clause. Its interpretation
is at odds, however, with the current literal meaning of "thorough and efficient."
"Thorough" means complete and with attention to detail, not basic or adequate.76 This was the precise conclusion reached by the trial court in Robinson.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, while not addressing the issue explicitly, appeared to reject the trial court's finding, returning to Landis: "Nor do we say
that if the State assumes the cost of providing the constitutionally mandated
education, it may not authorize local government to go further ...."7 How-

ever, even if the court did not believe "thorough" education was the most
complete education possible, the standard it established was high, and required
significant upgrading in many New Jersey school districts.
Meeting the needs of a rapidly changing and highly sophisticated industrial
society requires strikingly different kinds of skills and knowledge than might
have prepared individuals for relatively unskilled labor. Virtually all employment projections show that to be "competitors in the labor market,"
individuals increasingly must be professionals, white collar employees, or
skilled laborers.78 While some skills can be learned on the job, technological
explosions and social forces affecting the job market are producing progressively
higher entry-level educational background and skill requirements. The worker
of tomorrow is likely to have to understand computer systems, automated
7 Arguably, there can be no education better than a "complete" education. Translated into
.modern educational terms, thorough education might require the maximization of individual
students' potential. This was essentially the approach proposed by former Commissioner of Education Carl L. Marburger as the basis of the Bateman Act criteria. See also BATEMAN REPORT,
supra note 4, at 38. Still to be considered, however, is the meaning to be ascribed to "efficient."
The trial court referred primarily to "thorough education" throughout its opinion. But
"efficient' should not be viewed as superfluous. "Efficiency" looks to the effectiveness with
which resources are applied to achieve a certain end result. Thus, the New Jersey education
clause mandate could be met fully only if a "thorough" education were provided to all the state's
children by effective use of resources. This has provided support for the argument that "topping
off" or "local leeway" runs afoul of the education clause mandate because spending more than
necessary for a "thorough" education would not be "efficient." A more substantial argument is
that the efficiency of the public schools must be determined from a broad perspective. If the goal
of public education is to produce informed and productive citizens able to meet the demands of
modem industrial society, educational efficiency must be measured by society-wide standards.
For example, efficiency should be measured in terms of such economic indicators as income,
productivity, standard of living, and employment, which show a positive correlation with educational attainment. See 1971 U.S. STATISTICAL ABsTRACTS. Efficiency of the public schools should
also be judged in terms of the cost of dealing with their "failures," manifested by rising crime rates,
drug addiction levels, and welfare rolls. (Here, too, a correlation with inadequate education and
high drop-out rates has been found to exist.) See, e.g., GOVERNOR'S SELECar COMMISSION ON CIVIL
DISORDER, REPORT FOR ACTION (1968). Better schools will not eliminate criminality; they should,
however, enhance opportunities for economically and psychologically rewarding employment
and for more informed civic participation. For some of the studies illuminating these conclusions,
see C. BREMBECK, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF EDUCATION (1971); A. HALSEY, J. FLOUD & C.
ANDERSON, EDUCATION, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (1963); R. HAVIGHURST & B. NEUGARTEN,
SOCIETY AND EDUCATION (1962); J. NELSON & F. BESAG, SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES IN EDUCATION
(1970); P. SEXTON, EDUCATION AND INCOME: INEQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY IN OUR PUBLIC SCHOOLS
(1961). But cf. C.JENCKS, INEQUALITY (1972).
7 62 N.J. at 520, 303 A.2d at 298.
78
See, e.g., D. MICHAEL, THE NEXT GENERATION (1965); Miller, The Outlook of Working-Class
Youth, in BLUE-COLLAR WORLD 122 (A. Shostak & W. Gomberg eds. 1964); Rice, Employment
and Occupations in the Seventies, 23 EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP 230 (1965).
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programs and facilities, and cybernetic actions of business and government.
A fourth guideline concerning the New Jersey Supreme Court's interpretation of a "thorough and efficient" educational system also comes from its
endorsement of the Landis approach. In that case, the court suggested that
before an education superior to "thorough" could be provided anywhere in
80
the state, every child must have been receiving a "thorough" education.
Assuming that with the court's guidelines a workable definition of "thorough
and efficient" education can be developed, crucial questions remain to be
addressed under the education clause: who is entitled to assert an alleged
violation of the clause; on what grounds can such an assertion be made; what
response must the state make if a violation is established?
In Robinson, plaintiffs (taxpayers, students, parents, public officials, and
public bodies) maintained that each had constitutional rights which could
be asserted under the education clause. The court rejected the taxpayer claims,
finding that "it cannot be said the 1875 amendments were intended to insure
statewide equality among taxpayers."''s The court's acceptance of student
claims under the education clause seemed as complete as its rejection of taxpayers' claims. It expressed no concern about construing that clause to provide
students with justiciable rights in Robinson. How far the court is likely to extend
that principle is somewhat less clear, however.8 2 The logic of its approach
would suggest that a student could raise a justiciable issue by arguing that he
or she had been denied a thorough and efficient education by failure of the
state, the local school district, or even the particular school or teacher.
Justiciability does not resolve the issue of the grounds which would support
an assertion that the "thorough and efficient" mandate had not been met.
The court could have responded to that question in a number of ways: by
focusing directly on input,8 3 output,8 4 process,8 5 or some combination of
7' See D. MICHAEL, supra note 78.

80 In Landis, the court said that "the common rights of all [must be secured] before tendering
peculiar advantages to any." 57 N.J.L. at 512, 31 A. at 1018. But the court did not find it inappropriate for secondary schools to be provided to some students because it concluded that elementary education, at that time, constituted a "thorough" education. The school laws, "if properly
executed," would have provided an elementary education to all children. In Robinson, the court
concluded that some children were not receiving a "thorough" education under existing school
laws. If its constitutional theory were followed to a logical conclusion, then the "peculiar advantages"
available to some students would have to be withdrawn until the "common rights" of all children
were secured. See text accompanying notes 86-90 infra.
8162 N.J. at 513, 303 A.2d at 294.
12A participant in the 1947 Constitutional Convention, which carried forward the 1875
education clause, informally expressed the view that the intent of the Convention was not to create
a justiciable issue whenever a student alleged that he or she had been denied a "thorough and
efficient" education. Rather, the clause was intended as a mandate to the legislature to take necessary
action. The implication, presumably, was that the legislature, and not the courts, should determine
finally whether the mandate had been met. Some states have construed their education clauses
in this manner. Others, including New Jersey, have vested ultimate power in the judiciary to determine the sufficiency of legislative action.
83 "Input" refers to the tangible resources of school systems: physical plant, personnel, materials
and equipment, curriculum, and perhaps, ultimately, dollars. Measurement of most such input
elements seems objective. Age, condition, and size of buildings; existence of specialized facilities;
education and experience levels of personnel; pupil-staff ratios; quality and modernity of materials
and equipment; scope and diversity of curriculum-all lend themselves to straightforward comparisons from district to district and against a statewide standard. The relative ease with which
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these. However, the court chose to adopt "equal educational opportunity"
as its standard. It said that when the education clause was passed
an equal educational opportunity for children was precisely in mind. The mandate that there be maintained and supported a "thorough and efficient system
of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in the State between
the ages of five and eighteen years" can have no other import. Whether the
State acts directly or imposes the role upon
86 local government, the end product
must be what the Constitution commands.
The phrase "equal educational opportunity" is not free of ambiguity,
however.8 7 "Opportunity" may, at first blush, seem essentially input-oriented,
or at most oriented toward a combination of input and process. The literal
definition is somewhat different: "a combination of circumstances facilitating
a certain action...; an advantageous circumstance or combination of circumstances...; a time, place or condition favoring advancement or progress."'8
This imparts an idea of output; it is opportunity to achieve a certain result.
The quality of the opportunity, therefore, can be judged only in light of its
likelihood of facilitating the desired result. The court recognized this when it
defined the quality of the educational opportunity guaranteed by the education
clause as that "which is needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child for
'8 9
his role as a citizen and as a competitor in the labor market.
This approach may have permitted the court to avoid the rigidities of a
standard based exclusively on either input or output.9 0 The test should be
whether the educational input and process available to students throughout
the state were likely to permit them to achieve the desired outcome-the capacity to function as productive citizens. Equality of opportunity thus would
seem to embody a relative concept of input and process revolving about a fixed
comparisons of these factors can be made and the relative certainty of the results have led many
legislators and educational administrators-and some courts-to seize upon input as the measure
of a school system's quality.
84 "Output" refers to educational results or outcomes, which, in turn, are usually thought
to be measured by educational achievement tests. Employment data and entry into advanced
education are other common output yardsticks. Practical problems of relying upon output data
to measure "thorough and efficient" education abound, however. See, e.g., Yudof, supra note 56,
at 65. See also note 87 infra. The validity of standardized tests is being brought increasingly into
question, especially as they relate to members of minority groups. See, e.g., P. TRACTENBERG,
TESTING THE TEACHER ch. 6 (1973).
s5"Process" refers to the dynamics of the educational program. Rather than focusing upon
output or input, it looks to the atmosphere in which learning takes place and the interrelationships
among administrators, teachers, and students. It is probably the hardest of the aspects to evaluate

objectively.

"862 N.J. at 513, 303 A.2d at 294.

87

See Wise, San Antonio and Robinson and the Future of Legal Challenges to Public School Finance,
82 SCHOOL REv. 1 (1973). Wise suggests that of nine identified meanings of equality of educational
opportunity, the New Jersey Supreme Court employed at least five in Robinson. He expressed his
preference for a combination of two-a program of equal dollars per pupil modified to permit
additional dollar input for underachieving children. He rejected the educational outputs approach
primarily because of its tendency, in his view, to take "a giant step toward a state system of education." Id. at 25. He also saw practical and political problems in achieving a statewide consensus
about educational objectives and in translating such objectives into costs for individual children.
88 WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1583 (3d ed. 1961).
89 62 NJ. at 515, 303 A.2d at 295.
80 In Robinson, the court did use dollar input as its criterion, but this should not be understood
to exclude other possible criteria. See note 96 infra and accompanying text.
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output requirement.9 1 Additionally, differential educational resources or
can be proven reasonably
programming should be required to the extent they
92
opportunity.
educational
requisite
the
to
essential
The court's treatment of this point left some question, however, as to
93
whether the differential, or additional, input was mandatory or permissive.
The court's tentativeness may be explained not by uncertainty as to whether
differential input was required for some children as a matter of constitutional mandate, but by justifiable reluctance to specify the particular children
so entitled.9 4 The court said that this determination was properly left, 9in5
the first instance, to the State Education Department and/or the legislature.
The court's statement also introduced another element central to its decision-the relationship between the education clause and school funding.
91 This approach does create certain problems, however. Aside from the difficulty of measuring
output and correlating it to input and process, it may not be possible to treat the output requirement as fixed for all children. For example, under present conditions a child with severe
physical, mental, or emotional handicaps may simply be unable to become a "competitor in the
labor market," regardless of the "educational opportunity" provided. Yet that child is equally
entitled to a "thorough and efficient" education. This would suggest the need for a modification
of the fixed output requirement to permit variations in such cases. On the other hand, such a
modification might foster incrementalism. If physical, mental, or emotional handicaps must be
considered, should cultural, social, or economic factors be considered as well? Should intelligence
differences within the "normal" range be considered? Education systems may be moving in the direction of creating individual pupil output goals against which performance is periodically measured
and on the basis of which individualized programming is developed, but it is unfamiliar and uncomfortable terrain for the courts. The short-term answer for litigators may be that incrementalism must be resisted. Plaintiffs must argue that: (I) demonstration of manifestly inadequate
educational outcomes should constitute prima facie evidence of inadequate educational opportunity, and (2) in such cases defendant school systems have the burden of establishing either that
particular children or classes of children have in fact been given an educational opportunity
reasonably calculated to permit them to meet the fixed output requirement, or that they need not
be given such an opportunity because of their handicaps.
92 Generally, federal courts confronted with this kind of issue have taken the approach that
the burden of proof should initially be on plaintiff students to demonstrate their need. Compare
the lower court decision in Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1973) (equal protection does
not require that non-English speaking Chinese students be provided with bilingual compensatory
education in English), with Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools, 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 1972)
(equal protection violated where school district's bilingual program for Spanish-speaking students
was held unsufficient in view of poor test results). The United States Supreme Court reversed
the court of appeals in Lau, but solely on the basis of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
414 U.S. 563 (1974).
93 62 N.J. at 520, 303 A.2d at 297-98.
94 The court may have been mindful of the difficulty experienced by federal courts when confronted with the "educational needs" standard in earlier school finance cases. See, e.g., Burruss
v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), affd mem., 397 U.S. 44 (1970); McInnes v. Shapiro,
293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), affd mem. sub nom., McInnes v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
Arguably, though, the problem should be less bothersome in a case turning on the state education
clause rather than on an equal protection clause. The former imposes an affirmative obligation
on the state to provide for the education of all its children and establishes an explicit educational
quality standard which must be met. The latter, on the other hand, has generally been construed
to create a negative restraint-barring states from improperly treating classes of persons differently-and it has no explicit quality standard. Its focus on equality rather than quality of treatment
may justify greater concern about a judicial determination that unequal treatment in the form of
dollar input is required.
9- There are already many examples of legislatively and administratively determined educational
input differentials. The most prominent in New Jersey is the program for "handicapped" children
under which the state reimburses local districts for fifty per cent of their costs up to $4,000.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:46-1 et seq. (1968); N.J. ADM. CODE 6:28-1.1 et seq. (1973).
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That the clause was located in the article of the New Jersey constitution
dealing with taxation and finance, and that it spoke of "maintenance and support" of the public education system, were evidence of a substantial nexus.
The court, however, dealt more explicitly with the issue. Having previously
accepted the proposition that dollar input directly affected the quality of educational opportunity, the court chose to adopt dollar input as its criterion because it was "plainly relevant and because we have been shown no other viable
criterion for measuring compliance with the constitutional mandate.""0
Thus, the court tested the Bateman Act against the criterion of dollar
input. Given the wide range of educational expenditures from district to district, the court immediately concluded "[t]he constitutional mandate could
not be said to be satisfied unless we were to suppose the unlikely proposition
that the lowest level of dollar performance happens to coincide with the constitutional mandate and that all efforts beyond the lowest level are attributable
to local decisions to do more than the State was obliged to do. 9 7 The court
further concluded that the Bateman Act was "not visibly geared to the [constitutional] mandate." 9 The central problem for the court was the manner
in which fiscal responsibility was delegated to local districts. The state had
established no minimum dollar input level which would have ensured that all
school districts met the constitutional mandate. Moreover, "the State has never
spelled out the content of the educational opportunity the Constitution requires. Without some such prescription, it is even more difficult to understand
how the tax burden can be left to local initiative with any hope that statewide
equality of educational opportunity will emerge.'1 99
A third problem was the extent of reliance on local school district resources. Looking back to the 1871 school funding statute, the court found it
had embraced a statewide tax as the principal source of funds, "because it
was found that local taxation could not be expected to yield equal educational
opportunity."' 0 0 But "[s]ince then the State has returned the tax burden to local school districts to the point where at the time of the trial the
State was meeting but 28% of the current operating expenses. There is no
more evidence today than there was a hundred years ago that this approach
96 62 NJ. at 515-16, 303 A.2d at 295. For other possible criteria for determining equality
of educational opportunity, see A. WisE, supra note 3, at 143-59. In a suit challenging a school
finance statute, the only germane criteria would seem to be those involving the distribution,
or perhaps the raising, of funds. The court's decision to use dollar input was, therefore, understandable.
97 62 N.J. at 516, 303 A.2d at 295.
8
Id. The court reiterated this conclusion at least five times, in only slightly different ways,
in the last six pages of its opinion. Illustratively, the court said: "On its face the statutory scheme
has no apparent relation to the mandate for equal educational opportunity," id. at 516, 303 A.2d
at 296. The references to the Bateman Act sound very much as if, in equal protection terminology,
the court found no rational basis for the statute. Were it not for the court's concern about the
inevitable extension of an equal protection holding to all other governmental services, the references might suggest how it would have decided the case under the state equal protection clause.
On the other hand, in applying the equal protection clause the court could conceivably measure
the rationality of the means chosen against different objectives or justifications than under the
education clause. See note 62 supra.
9962 N.J. at 516, 303 A.2d at 295.
1
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will succeed." 101 The low percentage of state aid was attributable in part to
the fact that the Bateman Act had been only partially funded. The court,
however, saw "no basis for a finding that the 1970 Act, even if fully funded,
would satisfy the constitutional obligation of the State. ' 10 2 Its crucial problem,
then, was to determine the appropriate remedies.
The court's only explicit statements as to remedies were that "relief must
be prospective,"10 3 and that since "some period of time will be needed to establish another statutory system, obligations hereafter incurred pursuant to
existing statutes will be valid in accordance with the terms of the statutes."10 4
sought the further views of the parties as to the content
Otherwise, the court
10 5
of the judgment.
After another full oral argument during which the parties and amici urged
a range of views, the court rendered a brief per curiam opinion in which it
refrained from ruling on the question of judicial power to redistribute appropriated funds, gave the legislature until December 31, 1974, to enact constitutionally sufficient legislation which would be effective by July 1, 1975,
and retained jurisdiction so that "[a]ny party may move for appropriate re10 6
lief before or after December 31, 1974, if new circumstances so warrant."
The court has thus deferred deciding the difficult issues raised by the parties
and by the trial court's opinion. No decision may be tantamount to a negative
decision, however. The advantages of an advance specification of the sanctions
which will attach if the legislature fails to act within the stipulated time are
twofold: (1) added pressure would be brought to bear on the legislature to
act (at least if the sanctions are meaningful); and (2) by order of the court the
school finance system would be brought into greater conformity with the constitutional mandate on an interim basis. The alternative which is likely to
flow from the court's approach is that, should the legislature fail to meet the
timetable, the court will thereafter have to decide what sanctions to impose
10 7
or what adjustments can, and should, be made in the school finance system.
101Id., 303 A.2d at 295-96.
10
2Id. at 519, 303 A.2d at 297. Presumably, this conclusion was based upon the view that
the deficiency could not be cured simply by pumping more state funds into a formula "not demonstrably designed to guarantee that local effort plus the State aid" would yield the constitutionally
mandated
educational opportunity. Id.
10
3 Id. at 520, 303 A.2d at 298.
104
Id. at 520-21, 303 A.2d at 298.
105The court specifically sought further argument about "whether the judiciary may, as the
trial court did with respect to the 'minimum support aid' and the save-harmless provision of the
1970 Act.... order that moneys appropriated by the Legislature to implement the 1970 Act
shall be distributed upon terms other than the legislated ones." Id. at 521, 303 A.2d at 298. See
note 44 supra.
106 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65, 66 (1973).
107 A range of possibilities exist for the parties and the court. First, the court might be asked
to require the appropriation of sufficient funds to permit all districts to provide the equal educational opportunity commanded by the education clause. Second, the court might be asked to
reallocate funds already appropriated in a manner more consistent with the constitutional mandate.
Third, the court might be asked to prohibit the appropriation and expenditure of funds within
certain districts or for certain purposes.
These alternatives pose descending degrees of difficulty. Because the appropriation of funds
has always been regarded as a central legislative function, a state court mandate of specific appropriation action would raise difficult questions regarding the separation of powers doctrine.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

As a practical matter, because this process probably will begin after January 1,
1975, any adjustments may have to await the 1976-1977 school year.' 0 Children
throughout the state who have been denied a thorough and efficient system of
free public schools due to unequal and inadequate expenditures will suffer
the irretrievable loss of yet another school year.
CONCLUSION

Robinson has been greeted both with acclaim and foreboding by New Jersey
residents, depending upon their geographic locations, their socioeconomic
positions, and their views about public education. Most agree, however, that
the decision is likely to lead to fundamental changes in school financing, in
public education generally, and perhaps even in the structure of state and local
government.109
The legislative and executive branches have begun the complex process of
responding to the court's mandate of a new school finance law for New Jersey.
Their response must be shaped to reflect the following constitutional guidelines
which the court articulated: (1) the state must spell out "the content of the
educational opportunity the Constitution requires"; 11 (2) the state must ensure
that the required educational opportunity is provided equally to all children
However, once the legislature has appropriated funds for the operation of the public education
system, and the issue is how those funds should be allocated among the school districts, a state
court should be freer to fashion remedies. The court can surely bar the distribution and use of
funds, in whole or in part, under an unconstitutional statute. The more difficult question is
whether the court can permit the statute to continue to operate in part, barring the use of some
funds for the statutory purposes, and can also affirmatively order the redistribution and use of
those appropriated funds for purposes it determines to be constitutionally required. This is the
question the New Jersey Supreme Court twice had before it and twice refused to answer (after
the trial court had explicitly ordered such redistribution).
It may not be necessary, however, for the court to reach the difficult questions involved in
affirmatively ordering a specific appropriation or redistribution of already appropriated funds.
The more traditional judicial remedy of negative relief-an injunction against continuation of
unconstitutional acts-may be sufficient in this case. The court could, for example, focus on
the unconstitutionality of the school financing statute while still applying considerable pressure
on the legislature to achieve a longer-term solution to the problem of fiscal inequality by enjoining
distribution of minimum aid and save-harmless funds to each school district in the state whose
average expenditures per weighted pupil for the 1974-1975 school year (excluding expenditures of
federal funds) exceeded the statewide average of expenditures for the same school year by at
least the amount of minimum aid and save-harmless funds received by such district during that
school year. A similar approach could be utilized for capital aid, and, if the court could obtain
jurisdiction, it might limit the amounts which high-spending districts could raise locally for educational purposes.
108 Under the New Jersey education laws, the budget process for the school year beginning
July 1 starts by November 15 of the prior year, when the Commissioner of Education must estimate
the total amount of state aid necessary and the amounts to be payable to each county and school
district during the succeeding school year. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:58-13 (1973). Each board of
education must prepare its budget in January or February, and the local fiscal processes are largely
completed by the end of February. See id. §§ 18A:22-7 et seq.
109 The history of school finance in New Jersey, however, provides support for the skeptics
who believe Robinson will not result in drastic changes. Legislative unwillingness to appropriate
sufficient funds, political deference to educational home rule, and the need to pacify suburban
interests by increasing state aid to their districts have diminished the actual impact of the most
progressive-sounding programs. See BATEMAN REPORT, supra note 4, at 11-21.
110 62 N.J. at 516, 303 A.2d at 295. The State Education Department has developed a proposed
definition. Its proposal will be the subject of public debate and, ultimately, legislative scrutiny.
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in the state;"' (3) the state must provide a mechanism by which the educational
opportunity being afforded can be assessed; 1 12 and (4) the state must ensure

that appropriate corrective action is taken if it appears that certain school
districts are not providing the required educational opportunity."

3

A wide array of possible legislative and administrative approaches will
have to be considered in New Jersey in light of Robinson and its constitutional
guidelines. Insofar as consideration of a new school finance law is concerned,
the permutations and combinations will be increased by the fact that alternatives to both revenue-raising and revenue-distribution may have to be en-

compassed. There are, however, many precedents to consider. The more
prominent possibilities fall into four general categories: (1) recommendations
of national or state study commissions; (2) amendments to existing New Jersey
legislation; (3) legislative bills already introduced in New Jersey; and (4) school
4
finance statutes recently enacted in other states."
11 Given the court's emphasis on dollar input, the state must guarantee that all districts expend
the amounts determined to be necessary for the required educational opportunity. The court
questioned whether continued substantial reliance on locally-raised revenues could permit the
state to meet its constitutional obligation, but stopped short of mandating a school finance system
based on a statewide tax.
"12 In defining the constitutionally mandated educational opportunity, and in establishing
the correlative dollar input, the state will be moving into largely uncharted territory. Assumptions
will have to be made both about the educational outputs demonstrating capability for effective
citizenship and competition in the labor market, and about the educational inputs and process
reasonably likely to produce those outputs in all children. Moreover, the conceptions of the level
of educational outputs guaranteed by the education clause will themselves surely change. It is inconceivable, therefore, that a new statutory plan could be sensitive to the education clause's
command, as the court defined it, without an evaluation component to test the above assumptions
and refine them based on experience, and to update the plan as society changes. The need for
such a component was made explicit in the trial court's opinion, 118 N.J. Super. at 281, 287
A.2d at 217, and was at least implicit in the supreme court's opinion. After the trial court's opinion
was filed, the State Education Department developed and began to implement a statewide pupil
assessment program which may provide the basis for the evaluation implicitly required by the court's
construction of the education dause. For information regarding this program, see Tractenberg,
supra note 18, at 433 n.320.
113A variety of enforcement techniques are available. The most common is the withholding
of state aid, see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:33-2 (Supp. 1973), but that would almost certainly
be inappropriate in most situations. Indeed, providing additional state funds, or requiring the
district to raise additional local funds, might at times be a more appropriate response. Aside from
the issue of the adequacy of funds and the proper state response to it, however, there are conceivable educational shortcomings which might require a range of state corrective action. Local
districts might, for example, use available funds in an inefficient or improper manner, or might
fail to comply with state law or regulations or with their own regulations or policies. State responses
to such situations might include issuance by the state education authorities of an order to the particular school district specifying the corrective action to be taken. If the district failed to comply,
the state could seek to enforce its order by: (1) obtaining a court order which embodied the terms
of its order, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-(9)(b) (1970) (pertaining to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission); (2) removing recalcitrant board of education members or professional
staff, see, e.g., N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 2590-1(1)(b) (McKinney 1970); (3) assuming operating responsibility for the district until deficiencies were corrected or until the local board of education or
professional staff provided sufficient evidence of their willingness and ability to carry out the required corrective action, see, e.g., id. § 2590-1(1)(a). A totally different state response would be to
free the school district from a variety of state constraints, such as teacher certification and class
size restrictions, in order to permit the district to attempt to improve its educational program
by innovative techniques.
114For a discussion of each of those categories and the constitutional issues which may be raised
by particular proposals, see Tractenberg, supra note 18, at 434-56.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

Applying the Robinson guidelines to these alternatives results in a striking
congruence of the following elements of an equitable and constitutional school
finance law: (1) greater state assumption of education costs; (2) leveling up
of low-spending districts to an expenditure level determined to be sufficient
to permit them to provide a thorough and efficient system of free public
schools; (3) limited, and probably power equalized," a5 local add-ons; (4) recognition of educational need in the allocation of resources by weighting pupils
who require higher cost programs' 16 or by categorical aid programs; (5) recognition of higher urban costs (and other area cost-of-living differences);
(6) an effective evaluation system; and (7) preservation of local control to the
extent consistent with the overriding need to equalize educational opportunity
and with the state's constitutional obligation to ensure, by appropriate corrective measures, that a thorough and efficient education system is actually
7
being provided for all children. 11
The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Robinson should provide the
impetus for long-overdue reform of educational finance, education itself,
and perhaps ultimately, of the way in which the entire range of governmental
services are provided. At least, by its willingness to begin entertaining issues of
fundamental importance to the structure of state and local government, the
court has created a powerful inducement for responsible legislative and executive action. One can only hope that legislators in New Jersey and other states
will seize the initiative from the courts and develop the lasting and comprehensive reform which they are best constituted to provide.
"1

"District power equalization" is a plan which has as its goal discarding property wealth

as a component for determining a district's expenditure level. Under such a plan, local tax rates
are the sole determinant of a district's expenditures. If the state's guaranteed expenditure level
for the tax rate selected cannot be met because local property values are too low, the state must
supply the difference. Conversely, if the tax levy produces more than that guaranteed by the
state, the state takes the surplus. See J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, supra note 3, at 240-42.
116For example, a vocational student might be counted as 1.5 students for state aid distribution purposes, meaning that the per pupil revenue for such students will be one and a half times
that1 for
regular students.
17
See Berke, The Recent Adventures of State School Finance: A Saga of Rocketships and Glider
Planes, 82 SCHOOL REv. 183 (1974).

